

# The Past, Polish Politics of Memory, and Stereotyping: an intercultural perspective

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**Abstract:** The main idea of the article is to consider the interdependence between Politics of Memory (as a type of narrating the Past) and Stereotyping. The author suggests that, in a time of information revolution, we are still constructing images of others on the basis of simplification, overestimation of association between features, and illusory correlations, instead of basing them on knowledge and personal contact. The Politics of Memory, national remembrance, and the historical consciousness play a significant role in these processes, because – as the author argues – they transform historically based 'symbolic analogies' into 'illusory correlations' between national identity and the behavior of its members. To support his theoretical investigation, the author presents results of his draft experiment and two case studies: (a) a social construction of images of neighbors based on Polish narrations about the Past; and (b) various processes of stereotyping based on the Remembrance of the Holocaust. All these considerations lead him to state that the Politics of Memory should be recognized as an influential source of commonly shared stereotypes on other cultures and nations.

**Key words:** politics of memory, stereotyping, national remembrance, socially-shared knowledge, the Holocaust.

## Introduction

In the era of globalization and mass-communication, a proper selection of information becomes one of the most critical aspects of the cultural participation of the human being. The ongoing information revolution gave birth to a situation wherein, in principle, everyone has an unlimited access to infinite sources of knowledge. However, this process also resulted in a general excess of information and a reduction of its credibility. Since human beings aim at the reduction of the exhausting and resource-consuming process of deliberation<sup>2</sup>, we search for reliable sources of information and simplified models of understanding Reality which may be applied immediately.

Nowadays, almost everyone is able to travel, visit different states, and meet distinct cultures. Furthermore, almost everyone has the possibility to establish contact with members of other cultural communities. The metaphor of a 'global village' becomes more and more adequate, and neither political nor cultural borders limit the communication between cultures. At the same time, the widespread access to mass-media, especially television and the Internet, enables a flow of information on an unprecedented scale. But does it really change the way we construct images of others, or does it just cause a cognitive confusion?

In November 2012, I conducted a draft experiment, investigating sources of images of other nations. I asked my students to list typical features of ten nations<sup>3</sup> and substantiate their authenticity. The result of this exercise was surprising: most of the listed features were based on unverified stereotypes (about 60%) and historical narrations (about 25%), while a minority of them was based on personal intercultural contacts (about 10%) or verified knowledge (about 5%). In spite of the unlimited access to information and knowledge, as well as the visiting of different states, Polish students still constructed their representations of others mostly referring to simplified cultural contents and socially-shared understandings from the Past; for them, Americans were associated with an image of widespread obesity, Czechs with an image of drinking beer triflers, Frenchmen with an image of cowardice and betrayal in the presence of danger, Jews with an image of resourcefulness and greed, Germans with an image of scrupulous war criminals, Russians with an image of drunk imperialists, and Spaniards with an image of good-looking idlers. In February 2013, when I repeated the exercise with a group of Kazakh students, I received close results about sources of typical features in representations of other nations.

This draft experiment preliminarily confirmed my presumption that, in the case of excess of information and necessity of its verification, individuals prefer to apply simplified models of understanding Reality, like socially-shared stereotypes and common opinions from the Past. These explanations are sufficiently reliable for us, so we do not expect infallible and authentic reasons (even if we are able to find them). We are satisfied with illusory correlations and overestimate the association between variables: being a member of a cultural group (e.g. nation) and a certain behavior (an attitude) or an action from the Past. As Catherine A. Sanderson pointed, it helps us “feel safe in an often unpredictable world”<sup>4</sup> and believe that Reality is organized according to constant rules.

The influence of this phenomenon, as Paul M. Sinderman, Richard A. Brody and Philip E. Tetlock pointed in their study, is deeper than just the using of simplified models in communication between individuals – they stated that even if someone's judgments about individuals are not driven by stereotypes, their general political choices still may be.<sup>5</sup> So, referring to my draft experiment and the students' answers – someone who states that Germans are 'scrupulous war criminals' may be open-minded while communicating with an individual German, but his/her general political choices may still be based on dislike and a feeling of threat, especially when this representation is supported by both cultural stereotypes and national remembrance.

In this article, I would like to consider the relationship between historical consciousness, state narratives of the Past, and stereotyping others in a wider context of intercultural communication. I presume that in the age of information revolution and in the presence of excessive sources of knowledge, Politics of Memory becomes both a more reliable and more influential source of socially-shared representations of others. The paper includes a brief theoretical investigation based on my research studies related to the usage and the efficiency of Politics of Memory and its instruments, and two case studies, which seem to be quite representative: (1) depicting Russians and Germans in the Polish Politics of Memory and its influence on the construction of national stereotypes; and (2) constructing stereotypes as a result of the Remembrance of the Holocaust.

### Politics of Memory and Stereotyping

Normally, we define ourselves and our identities on the base of two main factors: membership of groups and one's own experience. Memory enables us to understand who we are and recognize our own place in social systems with reference to past actions.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, memory makes it possible to perceive regularities and rules which organize Reality. Almost a century ago, Dorothy Wrinch stated: "linking up our investigations with the question of how knowledge of the past is possible, we see that memory is one of the bases of knowledge."<sup>7</sup> So, there is no individual knowledge about the Past without individual memory, and there is no collective understanding of History without socially-shared narrations about it.

We may agree that Memory (and remembrance) plays two significant roles in the cultural life of a human being. It enables constructing identities on the basis of individual and collective experiences<sup>8</sup>, and it makes it possible to maintain a symbolic

continuity of the Past, the Present, and the Future (expectations).<sup>9</sup> Memory seems to be a powerful and important social resource. So, it is not surprising that it has become a subject of political interest, which uses narrations about the Past to popularize preferred attitudes and values, as well as to legitimate a government's authority.<sup>10</sup>

The Politics of Memory is but one way of narrating the Past. However, I assume that it is the most influential amongst them; it is more widespread than Individual or Organizational Narrations and Local Memories, and unlike Historiography<sup>11</sup>, it is homogenous and coherent. The Politics of Memory determines socially-shared frameworks of remembrance and shapes popular understandings of the Past. At the same time, its narrations make use of the credibility of the state as a narrator, and the universality of its institutions (e.g. public education).

As we have agreed with Wrinch's observation that memory is one of the bases of knowledge, we may also agree that shaping national memory causes changes in socially-shared (national) knowledge; because, if we believe that an action in the Past should be recognized as a heroic one, we will construct our definition of heroism with reference to this action, e.g. if we recognize Irena Sendler (who saved Jewish children from the Holocaust during the Second World War) as a Hero, we should understand heroism as an unselfish protection of the innocent from violence.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, if we recognize a suicide bomber as a Hero, we should define heroism as killing enemies (infidels) and self-sacrifice as a struggle against evil.

However, the efficiency of the narration depends on a few cultural conditions. We may assume that in Europe, the first example is more likely to occur than the second one. Even if the government commemorates suicide bombers and recognizes them as national heroes, most of the society (in a short-term perspective) will not share the definition of heroism as killing enemies and sacrificing oneself in this way. Lewis A. Coser properly pointed that "the present generation may rewrite history, but it does not write it on a blank page."<sup>13</sup> And this is the main limitation of the power of the Politics of Memory: a government may rewrite historical narrations and change their interpretation, but almost never will it narrate the Past from the very beginning.<sup>14</sup>

The Politics of Memory describes the Past, it determines what should be remembered and what should be forgotten, and it defines who should be recognized as a hero and who should be recognized as a traitor. Unlike Historiography, the Politics of Memory does not limit itself to narrating History, but it also judges past actions and forces defined, emotional opinions or interpretations. It does not present deepened analyses,

instead, it offers simplified labels and understandings based on essential divisions: good-evil, truth-falsity, heroism-cowardice, etc. And this is the evident common ground of the Politics of Memory and stereotyping.

Both historical consciousness and the complex of stereotypes are results of socialization and social learning. Furthermore, their acquisition is based on the need for simplified explanations about Reality and an aspiration for saving the energy needed to reflect upon such issue. We prefer simple and unambiguous interpretations of past actions, as well as easy-applicable scenarios of behavior to multilevel analyses and scenarios with multiple variables. Therefore, we are satisfied with simplified models like those used by my students in the draft experiment, e.g. Nazis were 'scrupulous war criminals' → Germans were Nazis → Germans are 'scrupulous war criminals' → Germans are scrupulous and dangerous.<sup>15</sup>

This symbolic analogy links three phenomena: the remembrance, the stereotype, and the attitude towards others, and it presents them as correlated. The Politics of Memory enables understanding and interpreting past actions in an unambiguous and emotional way; narration and its elements enable expressing specific opinions about every actor of a past action, which is favorable to constructing stereotypes. Finally, as we have agreed, stereotypes influence individual attitudes. Not only attitudes towards each member of another group, but as Sinderman, Brody, and Tetlock pointed, also attitudes towards whole nations and political choices connected with cooperating with them. Furthermore, Galen V. Bodenhausen, Andrew R. Todd, and Jennifer A. Richeson claim that stereotypes may also influence another aspect of communication: “spontaneous behaviors such as nonverbal reactions”<sup>16</sup> which are based on automatic associations.

We may agree that this 'junction' seems to be quite dangerous. If an ordinary stereotype is based on an overestimation of the association between variables (one's identity and behavior), the stereotype based on historical narrations derives its social influence from an affirmation of the extraordinary significance of the past action and an inter-generational experience. The peculiar source of stereotypes and the permanent reproduction of narrations make the association stronger and more durable.




Image 1. The Interdependence between narrating the Past and the social construction of stereotypes [source: own].

Image 1 represents this process. The past action is interpreted by the government and narrated as Politics of Memory. Then, the narration depicts actors (individuals and groups), their behavior, attitudes, beliefs, values, and attributes and labels them using emotionally characterized representations. Constructed images based on the Politics of Memory are simplified and unambiguous, because the accessibility of the narration forces describing characters, their identities, and their actions with reference to essential divisions. These images may be transformed into commonly-shared stereotypes after their simplification and generalization.

We may consider an example based on Jungmin Seo's study of the Remembrance of the Comfort Women in China and South Korea. He noticed that the narration about Japanese atrocities during the Second World War is “represented by individuals' excruciating narratives”<sup>17</sup>, which “makes a history of victimization as the core of identity formation.”<sup>18</sup> Images are unambiguous and they definitively state who the victim was and who the slaughterer was. Then, emotional representations enable the construction of stereotypes, which are strengthened by “the unfortunate political path of Japan that failed to separate pre-war and post-war Japanese identities”<sup>19</sup>.

This process connects the understanding of the Past and the stereotype thanks to three basic actions: (1) interpretation of History; (2) depiction of the narrative; and (3) simplification and generalization of narrative-based images. However, the Politics of

Memory is not the only way of narrating the Past which influences this process of transforming cultural contents. As we agreed with Coser's opinion about the limits of re-writing national remembrance by the state, and as we may notice in Image 1, the Politics of Memory is one of five possible media which can transform the past action into a source of stereotyping. Other media are: individual narrations (an eye-witness' testimony), organizational narrations (institutional memory), local memories, and historiography (scientific research) establish the cultural frameworks in which the government may interpret and depict the Past. Without a coherence of all types of narrative, the Politics of Memory may be recognized by society as unreliable or even counterfeit.

It is necessary to consider how the government may influence the social construction of stereotypes through the narrative of the Past, and under which conditions it is possible. As we agreed, the very first condition is the coherence of the Politics of Memory and other socially-shared historical narrations. In Image 2, we may notice that this condition is fulfilled thanks to the use of 'academic research' and 'the polyphony of narration' as instruments of the Politics of Memory. The first one enables the application of academic research and establishes a connection between the state's narrative and Historiography, while the second one makes use of other types of narrations as a legitimization of the authority of the Politics of Memory.<sup>20</sup>




Image 2. The use of instruments of politics of memory and social construction of stereotypes [source: own].

But the fulfillment of the first condition does not explain the establishment of the 'junction' between remembrance, stereotyping, and social attitudes towards others. It explains only how it is possible to narrate the Past in a reliable way. As we have noticed before, the construction of stereotypes requires unambiguous and simple associations of two variables: someone's identity and features (behavior). The presence of this correlation should be recognized as the second condition. In Image 2, this condition is fulfilled by the use of 'defining attitudes and values' as an instrument of the Politics of Memory.

Defining attitudes and values is a basic goal of the Politics of Memory. Considering the American Remembrance of Abraham Lincoln, Barry Schwartz and Howard Schuman stated that a direct relationship between the character and attitudes connected with his life enables a continuation of the reproduction of narratives, as well as their transition to the present.<sup>21</sup> In his earlier works, Schwartz noticed that narrating the Past does not only aim at commemorating national heroes and historical landmarks, but also at explaining how people should behave now, and what beliefs, expectations or values they should share. This remembrance is significant because it, at the same time, explains the Past and directs the Present and the Future<sup>22</sup>.

Remembrance and the Politics of Memory are more than narratives of the Past, they are a structure of interdependence between memorizing, recalling, identifying, and acting; they are also a justification of emotions and ways of reacting to social or political stimuli<sup>23</sup>. Historical narration may be used as a symbolic constitution of an appropriate behavior and a source of knowledge explaining which values are socially approved and commonly recognized as proper<sup>24</sup>. Moreover, we may assume that a Politics of Memory which only narrates the Past without emotional interpretation and labeling will be worthless for any government (as far as we agree that the aim of the Politics of Memory is to influence social attitudes and interactions).

Defining attitudes and values as an instrument of the Politics of Memory establishes an axiological order of narration; it explains who the hero was, who the slaughterer was, and who the traitor was in a simple way. This instrument delivers an unambiguous image of Reality, there is no place for doubts or deliberations. Germans are responsible for the Holocaust, so Germans are slaughterers, or Japanese are responsible for the sufferings of Comfort Women, so Japanese are slaughterers – these symbolic analogies precisely demonstrate the process of transformation of historical narration into the stereotype.



However, the fulfillment of the second condition does not force a social acceptance of the stereotype. Even if the narration is legitimized and recognized as a reliable one, and even if it includes some simplified associations between someone's identity and his/her features (which may be transformed into a stereotype), there is no certainty that the stereotype based on this narration will be constructed and commonly shared. There is also the third condition which has to be fulfilled: the narration needs to be widespread.

The government has at least three main instruments which it may use to popularize the narrative. These are: (1) education; (2) specialized institutions such as museums, institutions, centers, chambers or galleries; and (3) the usage of mass-media, especially television and the Internet<sup>25</sup>. Only thanks to them is the transmission of stereotypical contents possible. In schools, museums, and educational centers we learn not only about History, but we also assimilate its interpretation and accept certain attitudes and values which are defined in the narration<sup>26</sup>. And it is similar when we watch a TV series or a movie, and visit a website – we meet an interpretation of the Past which forces us to understand Reality in a certain way.<sup>27</sup>

Summing up, just as the stereotype is based on illusory correlations between two variables, the Politics of Memory makes use of symbolic analogies which enable the establishment of a relationship between past actions and present choices. The illusory correlation and the symbolic analogy are quite similar processes of simplification, which may transform a narration about the Past into a socially-shared stereotype. This phenomenon is possible under three conditions: (1) if a narration is recognized as reliable; (2) if a narration defines general attitudes and values in a simplified and emotional way; and (3) if a narration is widespread and there are some instruments for its popularization. The fulfillment of these conditions enables the social construction of durable stereotypes based on historical narrations, and the reconstruction of images of others, thanks to the narrative of the Past.

### Polish Remembrance in an Intercultural Perspective

In my draft experiment, Polish students were asked about the characteristic features of ten nations. In general, they based their answers on two types of sources: socially-shared stereotypes about others and simplified associations based on national remembrance. In order to substantiate their authenticity, they used the phrase 'because everyone knows that...' (e.g. Russians drink a lot of liquor or Americans eat a lot of fast-food, so they are obese), which referred to ordinary illusory correlations, or the phrase

'because everyone remembers that...' (e.g. Frenchmen betrayed their allies in 1939, or Russians conquered neighboring nations, or Germans committed war crimes during the Second World War), which referred to remembrance-based symbolic analogies.

It is evident that most of the second-type associations have been caused by common understandings of History, and influenced by the Polish Politics of Memory<sup>28</sup>. The results of the test on attitudes towards History and national remembrance, taken by participating students before the experiment, confirm this presumption<sup>29</sup>. As I mentioned before, a quarter of all answers was directly based on historical narrations, but this number increased if the historical connection between Poles and nation was developed; so, less symbolic analogies were used to describe characteristic features of Japanese or Spaniards, while almost half of the features assigned to Germans, Jews, and Russians were related to historical narrations.<sup>30</sup>

The common history of Poles and these three nations seems to be the core of the Polish Politics of Memory, where other nations appear only occasionally. The sore experience of conflicts with Germany and Russia, as well as the heritage of Polish-Jewish coexistence, shape the frameworks of Polish historical consciousness. However, all narrations are subordinated to the supra-narration of the Polish Politics of Memory – the Second World War and its aftermath. Tatiana Zhurzhenko stated that this subordination is part of a wider political phenomenon. She stated that the War “was the major pan-European trauma, [...] a tragic experience shared by virtually all European nations. But it is also true that nothing divides Europe more than the memory of this war, which ended almost seventy years ago”<sup>31</sup>.

The Remembrance of the Second World War is not only a complex of narrations which prevent European nations from a full reconciliation, but it is also a source of widespread stereotypes. We may consider two examples from the Polish Politics of Memory: the depiction of Russians and Germans. As I noticed before, in my draft experiment, students at the very first place described Russians as 'drunk imperialists' and Germans as 'scrupulous war criminals'. It is important to ask if these associations were caused by the Politics of Memory or not.

It is not just a Polish custom to characterize Russians as the nation overusing liquors and to associate 'being Russian' with 'being drunk'. We may recognize it as a universal stereotype, present in different cultures. However, the image of drunk Soviet soldiers is popularized in numerous testimonies quoted in historical narrations<sup>32</sup>. Eye-witness testimonies also depict Russians as uneducated and primitive people without “basic

technical knowledge”<sup>33</sup>.

But what seems to be remembered the most is the image of ruthless repression and atrocities – e.g. Przemysław Wywiół quoted the testimony of one of the defenders of the city of Grodno, who had written: “after Soviets came, they arrested my colleague. [...] They took him to a truck and killed him, he was cut by a burst. They left his corpse in the street”<sup>34</sup>. The permanent reconstruction of these narrations causes Polish opinions about Russians to include, at the same time, fear and dislike, and a feeling of cultural superiority. All these emotions directly refer to the remembrance of the Second World War, communist repression, and Soviet occupation of Polish territories.

However, the more significant in this description of Russians is the second part of it – 'imperialists'. Poles not only remember ruthless actions of individual Soviet soldiers, but they associate the Russian state with repeated aggressions and the desire to conquer Poland, what seems to be the core of Polish 'recurrence' of History<sup>35</sup>. The Partition of Poland in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, the 1794 Kościuszko Uprising, the 1830-1831 November Uprising, the 1863-1864 January Uprising, the 1919-1921 Polish-Soviet War, and finally the Soviet Aggression in 1939 and the sovietization of Poland after the Second World War – all these national narrations depict Russia as a state whose identity is founded on imperialism, expansionism, and a will to conquer neighboring nations<sup>36</sup>.

The symbolic analogy is clearly seen in a statement of President Lech Kaczyński, delivered on the 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2008 during the official lunch with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. He stated that “Georgian and Polish Nations have similar histories – because both these nations have to continue their tough struggle for freedom. Both were victims of the Russian imperialism”<sup>37</sup>. Few months later, on the 29<sup>th</sup> September 2009 in New York City, Kaczyński emphasized that the imperial tendency is the essential content of Russian identity, which is inscribed into the national tradition and the structure of government-society relations in Russia.<sup>38</sup>

This image of Russia and Russians is widespread in the Polish society. The powerful eastern neighbor is commonly recognized as dangerous and unpredictable. 'Because everyone remembers that...' Russians destroyed independent Poland in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, Soviets allied themselves with the Nazi Third Reich and attacked Poland in 1939, and Soviets murdered thousands of Polish prisoners of war during and after the Second World War. And, what is essential is that, if it happened in the Past, it may also happen in the Future, so the real nature of Russians should be remembered – that is how the symbolic analogies become stereotypes in Polish-Russian relations.

A creditable Polish historian and one of the creators of the contemporary Polish Politics of Memory, Paweł Machcewicz noticed that “Poland had two enemies and occupants. Their guilt and crimes against the Poles are not equal. The German aggression destroyed the existence of the Polish state. However, it happened with the Russian acceptance and their participation in the partition and occupation of Poland. The higher number of Polish citizens killed by Germans and their policy endangered the biological existence of the nation. [...] When in 1944 the Soviet Red Army once again invaded Polish territories, it brought enslavement and a communist regime, but at the same time it brought liberation from the genocidal actions of German occupants. That is how most Poles experienced it. It was not a lie of communist propaganda, but a historical fact”<sup>39</sup>.

The traumatic experience of German occupation and mass-murder policy during the Second World War still constitutes Polish historical consciousness. The Remembrance of the Holocaust and other mass repressions against the civilian population, intellectual elites and prisoners of war causes Germans to be depicted as Nazi slaughterers even in modern-day Polish society. However, unlike Russians, they are not depicted as unpredictable, chaotic, and impetuous, but as scrupulous and well-organized, so even more dangerous. As Machcewicz emphasized, German policy during the War endangered the biological existence of the whole nation, and as Tomasz Domański and Andrzej Jankowski stated, the genocidal policy was methodical and premeditated<sup>40</sup>.

This image is strengthened by two different factors. First, it is a social heritage of communist propaganda which presented Nazi Germans as a symbolic representation of Evil and popularized this stereotype. Second, it is a more universal association between 'being German' and 'being scrupulous', which is often used as an instrument of German soft power (e.g. by German industry<sup>41</sup>) and is present in numerous cultures. However, after the democratic transition and the Polish accession to the European Union, we have experienced a clear separation between the contemporary and the Nazi German identities in the Polish Politics of Memory. In general, Poles still associate 'being German' with 'being responsible for mass-atrocities during the Second World War', which is represented by describing them as 'scrupulous war criminals', like my students did in the draft experiment. This stereotype is present also in political actions<sup>42</sup>, as it was clearly seen in President Kaczyński's policy towards European integration. In August 2006, he reminded that German responsibility for the atrocities during the Second World War implied – even in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – additional duties towards the whole Europe. Kaczyński said that the strong social support for the Nazi government

during the War should make the whole German nation responsible for the atrocities of the Second World War<sup>43</sup>. 'Responsibility' seems to be a key-word to understand Polish-German relations. Even the pro-conciliatory Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, during the celebrations of the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Outburst of War, said that “we, Poles, wish to hear words about responsibility, about truth, to make today’s meeting a sign of hope for this part of the world”<sup>44</sup>, and forwarded these words mostly to Germans.

Summing up, narrations of the Polish Politics of Memory deliver numerous images of Russians and Germans and establish stereotypes about these two nations. Most of them are related to the Remembrance of Second World War, the most painful national experience in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, which still influences Polish national consciousness. Even now, both individual opinions and political actions are constituted by symbolic analogies based on the simplified reason 'because everyone remembers that...' which seems to be a phrase that transfers contents from narrations about the Past to the complexity of stereotypes.

### Stereotyping the Holocaust

The unique aspects of the Remembrance of Second World War are narrations about the Holocaust which also seem to be extremely significant in the Polish Politics of Memory. The long history of Polish-Jewish coexistence had its climax during the German occupation and the trauma of 'the Final Solution' still influences relations between these nations. However, the common sore experience of the genocide has resulted less in the establishment of a community of memory, than in constituting stereotypes in both cultures.

Stereotyping the Holocaust is a more universal cultural phenomenon. Western culture has seen the worldwide Jewish Diaspora and the State of Israel spread the notion of the Holocaust as a unique and singular case in the history of the World, recognized as the model and 'standard' for the suffering of any nation. 'The Holocaust' has become a synonym of 'the genocide', and Jewish history has become a 'model martyrdom of the nation'<sup>45</sup>. Genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, situations in Chinese Tibet and Somalia, and the war in Chechnya were more than once compared to the Nazi policy during the Second World War<sup>46</sup>.

We may notice that it is common to associate 'being Jewish' with 'being a victim' or 'being a survivor'. The significance of the Holocaust forces Western societies to

recognize Jews as primary victims of the Nazi genocidal policy, and in general as those who survived the genocide. This simplification is additionally strengthened by the feeling of guilt – in Germany and former Nazi allies caused by the perpetration of the Holocaust<sup>47</sup>, while in other Western states caused by not giving help and not preventing the genocide. As a result, as Robert Braun emphasized, some authors argue that “the Holocaust possesses an explicit moral meaning that should be represented in all historical narrative”<sup>48</sup>.

However, the Jewish community and the Israeli society often opposed recognizing the Holocaust as the main content of Jewish identity and image. Yael Zerubavel noticed that the sore experience of Nazi extermination caused the popularization of the Masada narration in Palestine, as a counter-metaphor which exhorts Jews to commit to self-defense against all enemies<sup>49</sup>. The existence and protection of the independent state of Israel became a counteraction against permanently associating 'being Jewish' with 'being a victim', especially 'a helpless victim'. All Israeli military actions in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries caused a dichotomy in stereotyping Jews. While Western societies still construct their representations with reference to the experience of the Holocaust, and depict Jews as victims of fanatic hate and the murderous plan of 'the Final Solution', Arab societies recognize Jews as cruel occupants and slaughterers, whereas Arabs depict themselves as victims of Israeli expansionism and Zionist terror.<sup>50</sup>

Even if Israeli foreign and internal policies explain why Arab and Western societies have opposite images of Jews, they cannot be recognized as the reason why Polish students depicted Jews more like Palestinians than Germans<sup>51</sup>. There are six main causes for this situation, and at least five of them are directly related to the Polish Politics of Memory and historical consciousness<sup>52</sup>.

First of all, Poles recognize themselves as 'survivors' and 'victims' of the Second World War and commemorate victims of the Holocaust in the wider context of Nazi repression. In Polish historical narrations, the extermination of the Jewish population is not a universal symbol of war atrocities, but it is only a part of the national martyrdom. While in Western Europe or in the United States the Holocaust narratives are the main content of the Remembrance of Second World War, in Poland they are on par with other narrations, like the Katyń Massacre, the 1944 Warsaw Uprising or the Expulsion of Poles.

Secondly, during the communist regime, the Remembrance of the Holocaust was incorporated into the complex of Polish martyrdom. Jewish victims of Nazi occupation

were not considered as 'being of Jewish nationality' but as 'Polish citizens'. So, the feature of 'being a victim' was not associated to the identity of 'being Jewish', but to the identity of 'being a Polish citizen'. Moreover, during Soviet occupation and communist rule, the negative stereotype of 'Żydokomuna' (*Jude-Communism*) was strengthened in Poland. Numerous Polish anti-communists blamed Jews for the introduction of communism and for supporting the sovietization of the state. The over-representation of Jews in communist security services caused that many Poles did not recognize Jews as 'victims', but more as 'slaughterers'. Currently, even if the Politics of Memory does not reconstruct this stereotype, it is still in use in society, and memories of the communist past still intensify Polish-Jewish tensions<sup>53</sup>.

Another cause for this, is the lack of historical guilt. Poles do not recognize themselves as responsible for the Holocaust, as the Politics of Memory and the national historical consciousness foster the glorious image of Poles who did not cooperate with German Nazis. Moreover, Polish historical narrations depict this nation as the sole in Europe which protected Jewish co-citizens and really opposed Nazi extermination policies. In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the issue of Polish Righteous among the Nations has become one of the most significant aspects of national remembrance<sup>54</sup>. So significant that, in 2007, in a common initiative, Polish President Kaczyński and Israeli President Shimon Peres supported the candidacy of Righteous Irena Sendler for the Peace Noble Prize as a symbolic commemoration of all Polish citizens who, during German occupation, rescued their Jewish neighbors.<sup>55</sup>

However, Jews do not agree with the Polish 'myth of innocence'. The publication of Jan Tomasz Gross's *Neighbors* in 2001, which covered the history of the massacre of Jewish population in the village of Jedwabne in July 1941<sup>56</sup>, was the beginning of a national debate over Polish-Jewish relations during the War and cases of Polish anti-Semitism<sup>57</sup>. Antoni Dudek noticed that the Jedwabne case was an ordeal for the Polish Politics of Memory and the newly-established Institute of National Remembrance; the aim was to counteract the spreading of a stereotype of Poles as an anti-Semitic nation who was co-responsible for the Holocaust<sup>58</sup>. However, neither academic research nor official inquiries changed the Jewish representation of Poles. But both actions have strengthened Polish images of innocence, which caused the deepening of differences between the Polish and Jewish historical consciousness, and – as a result – of mutual aversions.

Summing up, there are three main aspects of stereotyping the Holocaust, which are

quite opposite. The universal Western stereotype associates 'being Jewish' with 'being a victim' and 'being a survivor', which is supported by the widespread feeling of guilt, and, especially in Germany, by the post-Holocaust national trauma. Part of the Jewish community opposed against this simplification and compared the Holocaust to the counter-metaphor of active resistance, symbolized by the Defenders of Masada. It caused another process of stereotyping – the association between the Holocaust and 'helplessness'. Finally, in Poland we are able to observe 'the clash' of stereotyping based on the Remembrance of the Jewish genocide. Because Poles believe in their innocence during the Second World War (and the Politics of Memory supports this belief) they are not able to agree with Jewish accusations and assumptions that Poles are co-responsible for the extermination of Jews. This struggle over remembrance causes the Polish society to reject the recognition of Jews as the primary victims of War, and historical narrations remind that Jews were not only 'victims' of the Holocaust, but also 'Soviet slaughterers' of Polish patriots and national martyrs.

Polish-Jewish relations are remarkably influenced by mutual stereotypes based on historical experiences and their interpretation. The trauma of the Holocaust is underestimated in the Polish Politics of Memory; however, Jewish narrations equally underestimate Polish martyrdom. Jews used to state that 'maybe' Poles suffered during German and Soviet occupation, and 'maybe' some Jews caused their suffering, but 'everyone remembers that...' Poles murdered their Jewish neighbors during and after the War, while Poles used to state that 'maybe' Jews suffered the most during German occupation and 'maybe' they are the primary victims of the Nazi genocidal policies, but 'everyone remembers that...' Jews murdered their Polish neighbors during the Soviet occupation and after the War as communist servants. And symbolic analogies based on historical narrations are, in both cases, permanently transferred to national complexes of stereotypes.

### Conclusion

The Politics of Memory and, in general, narratives of the Past are sometimes sources of stereotypes. Simplified associations and illusory correlations may be not only constructed as a result of isolated, accidental, and unrepresentative contacts between nations, but also as a result of symbolic analogies which are the cultural effect of narrating the Past. In this article, I presented a draft theoretical research that considered possible interlinks between these two phenomena in the intercultural context. Moreover,



I showed how the Politics of Memory influences recognizing others and understanding their features in Poland in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Examples of Polish-Russian and Polish-German relations seem to be significant and interesting, and they too present how the historically-based stereotyping may affect political actions.

Depicting the Enemy – as in both these cases – is one of the most important aspects of the Politics of Memory, and it has an extensive influence on the state of relations between nations and their members. The transformation of Polish historical experiences into an aversion for neighbors is not an isolated example. We may consider American representations of Arabs after 9/11, East Asian opinions about the Japanese, images of Europeans in post-colonial cultures, and Palestinian representations of Jews and Israel as similar cases of the same phenomenon. However, we may notice the opposing aspect of historically-based stereotyping – depicting the Ally, which is clearly seen in European images of the United States and the American Nation.

Moreover, in this paper, I outlined the complexity of stereotyping the Holocaust, mainly considering its impact over Polish-Jewish relations. To explain how it is possible that such a common stereotype in Western cultures, which associates 'being Jewish' with 'being a victim' and 'a survivor', is not widespread in Polish culture, I studied five causes which are directly related to national remembrance. This brief research confirmed my presumptions that representations of Jews in Poland and representations of Poles by the Jewish community are based upon mutual historical 'injuries' which still obstruct a real reconciliation between these nations.

The hypotheses presented in this study are not final. Understanding the interdependence between narrating the Past and stereotyping requires further theoretical and empirical research. The goal of this article was to outline the phenomenon and to motivate researchers to carry out further studies. The Polish Politics of Memory seems to be only one (and probably not the most significant) area of transformation of historical narrations into stereotypes, but studying it enables us to notice how the social understanding of the Past may influence present relations between nations and the communication between their members.

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## Notes

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- 2 Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence. Science and Practice*, Boston 2009.
- 3 Americans, Britons, Czechs, Frenchmen, Japanese, Jews, Germans, Russians, Spaniards, and Ukrainians.
- 4 Catherine A. Sanderson, *Social Psychology*, Hoboken 2010, p. 340.
- 5 Paul M. Sinderman, Richard A. Brody & Philip E. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice. Explorations in Political Psychology*, Cambridge – New York 1999, pp. 255-258.
- 6 Mrinal Miri, *Memory and Personal Identity*, “Mind. New Series” 1971, vol. 82, no. 325, pp. 1-3.
- 7 Dorothy Wrinch, *On the Nature of Memory*, “Mind. New Series” 1920, vol. 29, no. 113, p. 61.
- 8 Jan Assmann mentioned six methods of how narrating the Past influences identities: (1) constructing individual identities as members of the group, participating in collective experience; (2) a capacity to reconstruct the Past with reference to actual and contemporary situations; (3) formatting of socially-shared knowledge and its institutionalized transmission; (4) organization of communication and *cultivation* of the collective memory; (5) establishment of social obligations, “a clear system of values and differentiations in importance”, which constitutes a reproduction of social self-imagination and enables the continuity of the social order; and (6) reflexivity: interpreting and explaining the social order, controlling individual actions, and placing the group inside the system of self-understanding and self-imagination. Jan Assmann & John Czaplicka, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, “New German Critique” 1995, vol. 68, pp. 130-132.
- 9 Gregory Hoskins, *The Politics of Memory and the World Trade Center Memorial Site*, “Journal of Social Philosophy” 2007, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 246-247; and Leszek Koczanowicz, *Polityka czasu. Dynamika tożsamości w postkomunistycznej Polsce*, Wrocław 2009, p. 31.
- 10 Jan Assmann, *Cultural memory and early civilization: writing, remembrance, and political imagination*, Cambridge – New York 2011.
- 11 I use 'Historiography' in a more basic sense, as scientific writing about History, which by applying a certain methodology aims at discovering past events and interpreting them on the basis of objectivity. I introduce this term to differentiate 'History' as the Past from 'History' as part of science and an academic discipline. For sources of this distinction see: Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, New York 1992.

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- 12 So, if we share this narration, we should aim at protecting the innocent in various situations (e.g. domestic violence) and behave in a way which will be consistent with our beliefs; at the same time, we should also oppose unjustified acts of violence in general (e.g. political repression, genocide crimes, racial discrimination). About the rule of the consistency see: Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence. Science and Practice...* op.cit.
- 13 Lewis A. Coser, *The Revival of the Sociology of Culture: The Case of Collective Memory*, "Sociological Forum" 1992, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 373.
- 14 It may be possible after radical revolutions.
- 15 About symbolical analogies see: Jerzy Topolski, *Historical Narrative: Towards a Coherent Structure*, "History and Theory" 1987, vol. 26, no. 4, p. 82; and Patryk Wawrzyński, *Mitomotoryczność opowieści: wykorzystywanie analizy narratywnej do badań znaczenia mitów kulturowych (w stosunkach międzynarodowych)*, "Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne" 2012, vol. 36, p. 159.
- 16 Galen V. Bodenhausen, Andrew R. Todd & Jennifer A. Richeson, *Controlling Prejudice and Stereotyping. Antecedents, Mechanisms, and Context* [in:] "Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination" ed. by Todd D. Nelson, New York – Hove 2009, p. 112.
- 17 Jungmin Seo, *Politics of Memory in Korea and China: Remembering the Comfort Women and the Nanjing Massacre*, "New Political Science" 2008, vol. 30, no. 3, p. 391.
- 18 Ibidem, p. 390.
- 19 Ibidem, p. 391. See also: Naoko Shimazu, *Popular Representations of the Past: The Case of Postwar Japan*, "Journal of Contemporary History" 2003, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 101-116; and Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005*, Cambridge 2006.
- 20 However, these two instruments are not the most significant. Even if they are necessary to fulfill the basic conditions of efficacy of the Politics of Memory, they are secondary factors in stereotyping through narrating the Past and constructing the national remembrance.
- 21 Barry Schwartz & Howard Schuman, *History, Commemoration, and Belief: Abraham Lincoln in American Memory, 1945-2001*, "American Sociological Review" 2005, vol. 70, no. 2, p. 186. See also: Merrill Peterson, *Abraham Lincoln in American Memory*, New York 1994.
- 22 Barry Schwartz, *Memory as Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II*, "American Sociological Review" 1996, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 908-927 and Idem, *Social Change and Collective Memory: The Democratization of George Washington*, "American Sociological Review" 1991, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 221-236.
- 23 Hiro Saito, *Reiterated Commemoration: Hiroshima as National Trauma*, "Sociological Theory" 2006, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 353-376.
- 24 Yael Zerubavel, *The Death of Memory and the Memory of Death: Masada and the Holocaust as Historical Metaphors*, "Representations" 1994, vol. 45, pp. 72-100; Jeffrey K. Olick & Daniel Levy, *Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint: Holocaust Myth and Rationality in German Politics*, "American Sociological Review" 1997, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 921-936; Geoffrey M. White, *Emotional Remembering: The Pragmatics of National Memory*, "Ethos" 1999, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 505-529; and Rosalyn Collings Eves, *A Recipe for Remembrance: Memory and Identity in African-American Women's Cookbooks*, "Rhetoric Review" 2005, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 280-297.

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25 However, in the past, the most significant media was literature, the arts, and music. Today, we may notice that all these seem to be less effective than television (including cinematography) and the Internet (including social networks). About the influence of the Internet on social processes, see: Christian Fuchs, *Internet and Society. Social Theory in the Informational Age*, New York 2008.

26 About the role of education in the popularization of narrations of the Politics of Memory, see e.g. Alexander Bukh, *Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization*, "Asian Survey" 2007, vol. 47, no. 5, pp. 683-704; Kazuya Fukuoka, *School History Textbooks and Historical Memories in Japan: A Study of Reception*, "International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society" 2011, vol. 24, pp. 83-103; Zheng Wang, *National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China*, "International Studies Quarterly" 2008, vol. 52, pp. 783-806; Reinaldo C. Iletto, *Philippine Wars and the Politics of Memory*, "Positions" 2005, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 215-234; Thomas Sherlock, *Confronting the Stalinist Past: The Politics of Memory in Russia*, "The Washington Quarterly" 2011, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 93-109; and Donald M. Reid, *Teaching in Tragedy by Teaching the History of Its Remembrance: Oradour-sur-Glane and American Students in September 2001*, "The History Teacher" 2002, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 441-454.

About the role of specialized institutions in the popularization of narrations of the Politics of Memory, see e.g. Katia Dianina, *Museum and Society in Imperial Russia: An Introduction*, "Slavic Review" 2008, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 908-909; Jungmin Seo, *Politics of Memory in Korea and China...* op.cit., pp. 369-392; James Ingo Freed, *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, "Assemblage" 1989, vol. 9, pp. 58-79; Judith E. Berman, *Holocaust Museums in Australia: The Impact of Holocaust Denial and the Role of the Survivors*, "Journal of Holocaust Education" 2001, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 67-88; Christine Cadot, *Can Museums Help Build a European Memory? The Example of the Musée de l'Europe in Brussels in the Light of 'New World' Museums' Experience*, "Journal of Politics, Culture and Society" 2010, vol. 23, pp. 127-136; Benjamin Claude Brower, *The Preserving Machine: The "New" Museum and Working Through Trauma – the Musée Mémorial pour la Paix of Caen*, "History & Memory" 1999, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 77-103; Alison Landsberg, *America, the Holocaust, and the Mass Culture of Memory: Towards a Radical Politics of Empathy*, "New German Critique" 1997, vol. 71, pp. 74-86; and Scott Worthy, *Communities of Remembrance: Making Auckland's War Memorial Museum*, "Journal of Contemporary History" 2004, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 599-618.

27 About the role of the usage of mass-media in the popularization of narrations of the Politics of Memory, see e.g. Olaf Hoerschelmann, „*Memoria Dextra Est*“: *Film and Public Memory in Postwar Germany*, "Cinema Journal" 2001, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 78-97; Nicola A. Lisus & Richard V. Ericson, *Misplacing Memory: The Effect of Television Format on Holocaust Remembrance*, "The British Journal of Sociology" 1995, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 1-19; Wulf Kansteiner, *Nazis, Viewers, and Statistics: Television History, Television Audience Research and Collective Memory in West Germany*, "Journal of Contemporary History" 2004, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 575-598; Liam Kennedy, *Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy*, "International Affairs" 2003, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 315-326; Kyung Hyum Kim, *Post-Trauma and Historical Remembrance in Recent South Korean Cinema*:

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- Reading Park Kwang-su's „A Simple Spark” (1995) and Chang Sŏn-u's „A Petal” (1996), “Cinema Journal” 2002, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 95-115; Barry Langford, ‘You cannot look at this’: *Threshold of Unrepresentability in Holocaust film*, “Journal of Holocaust Education” 1999, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 23-40; and Andrzej Szczerski, *Why the PRL now? Translations of Memory in Contemporary Polish Art*, “Third Text” 2009, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 85-96.
- 28 About the international aspect of the Polish Politics of Memory, see: Patryk Wawrzyński, *The Usage of Politics of Memory in Polish Foreign Policy: Present State and Perspectives*, “Copernicus Journal of Political Studies” 2012, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 67-91.
- 29 In the test they were asked to express their attitudes towards four aspects of national remembrance: (1) interest in contemporary history (5 – 20%, 4 – 30%, 3 – 30%, 2 – 15%, 1 – 5%, where 5 is 'high interest' and 1 is 'no interest'); (2) personal importance of the remembrance of the Past (5 – 15%, 4 – 45%, 3 – 35%, 2 – 5%, 1 – 0%); (3) interest in the history of the student's own family (5 – 20%, 4 – 30%, 3 – 40%, 2 – 10%, 1 – 0%); and (4) participation in organized acts of commemoration (5 – 5%, 4 – 5%, 3 – 40%, 2 – 35%, 1 – 15%, where 5 is 'very often' and 1 is 'never'). The results show that about 80-90% of participating students is interested in national history and considers national remembrance as an important aspect of their social life, however, only half of them (even sometimes) actively participate in acts of commemoration.
- 30 The only exception was an image of Czechs, which mainly included stereotypes based on cultural contents, especially well-known in Polish Jaroslav Hašek's series of novels *The Good Soldier Švejk* and in the – also well-known – Czech cinematography.
- 31 Tatiana Zhurzhenko, *Geopolitics of Memory: Rethinking World War II and the fight for hegemony in the Baltic-Black Sea Region*, “Crossroads Digest” 2011, vol. 6, p. 118.
- 32 Waclaw Jatkowski narrated: “they arrested bride and groom, and all guests. Maybe they got angry because a matchmaker did not give them enough bottles of vodka? They imprisoned us for the whole week in some basement in Sejny.” Quoted after: Ireneusz Sewastianowicz & Stanisław Kulikowski, *Nie tylko Katyń*, Białystok 1990, p. 12.
- 33 Tomasz Bereza, *Obraz czerwonoarmisty na okupowanych ziemiach polskich (1939-1941) w dokumentach, wspomnieniach i relacjach* [in] “Okupacja Sowiecka Ziem Polskich 1939-1941” ed. by Piotr Chmielowiec, Rzeszów – Warszawa 2005, p. 15.
- 34 Przemysław Wywiół, *Działania militarne w wojnie obronnej po 17 września*, “Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej” 2011, no. 8-9 (129-130), p. 71.
- 35 Patryk Wawrzyński, *The Remembrance of the Katyń Massacre and President Lech Kaczyński's Concept of Polish-Russian Relations [2005-2010]*, “Polish Political Science Yearbook” 2012, vol. 41, pp. 508-510.
- 36 Idem, *Prezydent Lech Kaczyński. Narracje niedokończone*, Toruń 2012, p. 238.
- 37 The Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, *Polska wspiera przynależność Gruzji do NATO*, 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2008, on-line: <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2008/art,83,polska-wspiera-przynaleznosc-gruzji-do-nato.html> [access: 27<sup>th</sup> February 2013].
- 38 Idem, *NATO to eksporter stabilizacji i pokoju*, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2008, on-line:

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- <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2008/art,579,nato-to-eksporter-stabilizacji-i-pokoju.html> [access: 27<sup>th</sup> February 2013].
- 39 Paweł Machcewicz, *Spory o historię 2000-2011*, Kraków 2012, p. 246.
- 40 Tomasz Domański & Andrzej Jankowski, *Represje niemieckie na wsi kieleckiej 1939-1945*, Kielce 2011.
- 41 Dominik Smyrgała, *Pokazowa lekcja dezinformacji. Premier Putin na Westerplatte*, "Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej" 2009, no. 12 (107), p. 13.
- 42 Paweł Machcewicz, *Spory o...* op.cit., pp. 249-253.
- 43 The Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, *O Porozumieniach Sierpniowych*, on-line: <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2006/art,634,o-porozumieniach-sierpniowych.html> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> February 2013]. See: Patryk Wawrzyński, *Prezydent Lech Kaczyński...* op.cit., pp. 223-229.
- 44 The Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, *PM: we remember and expect remembrance*, on-line: <http://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/aktualnosci/pm-we-remember-and-expect-remembrance.html> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> February 2013].
- 45 Nancy J. Peterson, "If I were Jewish, how would I mourn the dead?": *Holocaust and Genocide in the Work of Sherman Alexie*, "MELUS" 2010, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 63-64.
- 46 David Cesarani, *Does the Singularity of the Holocaust make it Incomparable and Inoperative for Commemorating, Studying and Preventing Genocide? Britain's Holocaust Memorial Day as a Case Study*, "Journal of Holocaust Education" 2001, vol. 10 no. 2, pp. 48-50.
- 47 Wolfgang Meseth and Matthias Proske considered the feeling of guilt as a result of German national trauma. They stated that "trauma embeds past into the present as an involuntary memory that appear over and over again; it cannot be forgotten. [...] We can expect to encounter the term not only in reference to the victims of Nazi crimes and their descendants. In speaking of Germany's "collective trauma", the term is extended to the perpetrators and their descendants, whose experience of guilt and shame is also referred to as a trauma." Wolfgang Meseth & Matthias Proske, *Mind the gap: Holocaust education in Germany, between pedagogical intentions and classroom interactions*, "Prospects" 2010, vol. 40, p. 214.
- 48 Robert Braun, *The Holocaust and Problems of Historical Representation*, "History and Theory" 1994, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 181.
- 49 Yael Zerubavel, *The Death of Memory...* op.cit., p.78.
- 50 Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine. The Politics of National Commemoration*, Cambridge – New York 2007.
- 51 I use these two nations not to compare them with Poles or their history with Polish history, but to present two opposite points of a continuum of images of Jews.
- 52 The only reason which is not connected to Polish historical narratives is the cultural presence of negative stereotypes about Jews, that depict this nation as greedy, crafty, and resourceful. As I noticed in my draft experiment, these representations are still the most powerful source of images of Jews in Polish culture.

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- 53 As an example we may consider nationwide exhibitions “Twarze Bezpieki” (“Faces of the Communist Security Forces”) and series of monographs under the same title prepared by the Institute of National Remembrance in years the 2008-2009. See: Institute of National Remembrance, *Twarze Bezpieki*, on-line: [http://ipn.gov.pl/zasoby-cyfrowe/twarze-bezpieki?result\\_74060\\_result\\_page=1](http://ipn.gov.pl/zasoby-cyfrowe/twarze-bezpieki?result_74060_result_page=1) [access: 28<sup>th</sup> February 2013].
- 54 The most significant role in commemorating Polish Righteous is played by the Institute of National Remembrance and the Museum of History of Polish Jews in Warsaw. See: Institute of National Remembrance, *Życie za życie*, on-line: <http://www.zyciezazycie.pl/portal/zyz/> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> February 2013]; and The Museum of History of Polish Jews, *The Polish Righteous*, on-line: <http://www.sprawiedliwi.org.pl/en/cms/polish-righteous/> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> February 2013].
- 55 The Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, *Irenę Sendlerową należy traktować jako wielką bohaterkę*, on-line: <http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwalne-aktualnosci/rok-2007/art,64,irene-sendlerowa-nalezy-traktowac-jako-wielka-bohaterke.html> [access: 28<sup>th</sup> February 2013]. See: Patryk Wawrzyński, *Prezydent Lech Kaczyński...* op.cit., pp. 210-214.
- 56 Jan Tomasz Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, Princeton 2001.
- 57 See e.g. Sławomir Kaprański, *Battlefields of Memory. Landscape and Identity in Polish-Jewish Relations*, “History & Memory” 2001, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 35-58; Idem, *The Jedwabne Village Green? The Memory and Counter-Memory of the Crime*, “History & Memory” 2006, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 179-194; Ewa Wolentarska-Ochman, *Collective Remembrance in Jedwabne. Unsettled Memory of World War II in Postcommunist Poland*, “History & Memory” 2006, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 152-178; Idem, *Response to Sławomir Kaprański*, “History & Memory” 2006, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 195-197; and *Wokół Jedwabnego. Tom 1: Studia* ed. by Paweł Machcewicz & Krzysztof Persak, Warszawa 2002.
- 58 Antonii Dudek, *Instytut. Osobista historia IPN*, Warszawa 2011, pp. 136-137.